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DragonForce

A ransomware operation that calls itself a cartel, offering affiliates tools and infrastructure to run their own brands. M&S has said it was hit with DragonForce ransomware, and Arete reported rising activity in 2026.

Threat actor profile. Last reviewed 3 November 2026.

Overview

Why It Matters

The UK retail attacks of April 2025 made this name known here. M&S's chairman told a parliamentary hearing that M&S was hit with DragonForce ransomware and that attackers entered by social engineering a third party. The NCA arrested four people in the investigation into M&S, Co-op and Harrods, and its statement does not name DragonForce. Arrests are not convictions.5 The NCSC said at the time that it could not yet say whether the attacks were linked.6

The model spreads risk. Since March 2025 DragonForce has presented itself as a cartel, encouraging affiliates to build their own brands on its tools.2 That can make attribution by name unreliable, as an attacker may use its tools with little link to its core team.

Supply chain routes are a real concern. Sophos saw an attacker use an MSP's SimpleHelp RMM instance to reach several customers and deploy DragonForce, and it says it has medium confidence that three SimpleHelp flaws were chained.3 Symantec says one 2026 case hid command and control traffic inside Microsoft Teams relay infrastructure, so it looked like normal connections to Teams servers.1

Our View

Scattered Spider links are reported but not all confirmed.7,8 We would plan for a mix of social engineering and technical access. Controls on help desks and on MSP tools both matter.

Attack Chain

How It Attacks

Combined from Trend,2 Sophos3 and Symantec.1 The cartel model means methods vary widely, so this is a pattern and not a fixed script.

  1. 1

    Get In

    Exploits public-facing appliances, uses valid accounts, or reaches customers through an MSP's RMM tool. Some intrusions are linked to social engineering by others.5

  2. 2

    Discover

    Uses AdFind, Advanced IP Scanner and RMM data about devices and users.

  3. 3

    Take Credentials

    Uses Mimikatz, LaZagne and registry hive dumps.

  4. 4

    Blind the Defences

    Uses vulnerable drivers to stop EDR and antivirus. Symantec describes a custom driver too.

  5. 5

    Move and Hide

    Uses PsExec, RDP, WMI, Cobalt Strike and SystemBC. In one case it used a custom backdoor over Teams relays.

  6. 6

    Steal the Data

    Moves data with MEGA, FTP or SFTP, and HTTP servers.

  7. 7

    Encrypt

    Uses variants for Windows, Linux, ESXi and NAS. The ESXi variant powers off VMs.

MITRE ATT&CK

Key Techniques

ATT&CK v20 has no DragonForce entry. These follow Trend's mapping2 and Sophos's MSP case.3 We have updated IDs to v20 where needed.

IDTechniqueTacticWhat It Looks Like
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial AccessIvanti Connect Secure and other flaws.
T1078Valid AccountsInitial AccessCompromised accounts.
T1199Trusted RelationshipInitial AccessReaches customers through an MSP's RMM.
T1003.001LSASS MemoryCredential AccessMimikatz.
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsDefense ImpairmentVulnerable drivers stop security tools.
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral MovementRDP for movement.
T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageExfiltrationMEGA.
T1490Inhibit System RecoveryImpactDeletes shadow copies.
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactImpactEncrypts with per-file keys.
Tooling

Tools Observed

Discovery and Credentials

AdFindAdvanced IP ScannerLaZagneMimikatzPassView

Movement and Control

Backdoor.TurnCobalt StrikePsExecRemotelySimpleHelpSystemBC

Defence Evasion

PCHunterProcessHacker

Data Theft

FTP or SFTP clientsMEGA

From Trend,2 Symantec1 and Arete.4 Many tools are legitimate, so check whether a tool is approved.

Vulnerabilities

Named by Trend2 and Sophos.3 Affiliates differ, so this list is a guide.

CVE-2024-57727SimpleHelp path traversal. Sophos has medium confidence it was chained in an MSP attack.3 In the CISA KEV catalogue since 13 February 2025, with known ransomware use.9
CVE-2024-57728SimpleHelp arbitrary file upload, in the same chain.3 In the CISA KEV catalogue since 24 April 2026, with known ransomware use.9
CVE-2024-57726SimpleHelp privilege escalation, in the same chain.3 In the CISA KEV catalogue since 24 April 2026, with known ransomware use.9
CVE-2023-46805Ivanti Connect Secure.2 In the CISA KEV catalogue since 10 January 2024, with known ransomware use.9
CVE-2024-21887Ivanti Connect Secure.2 In the CISA KEV catalogue since 10 January 2024, with known ransomware use.9
CVE-2024-21893Ivanti Connect Secure.2 In the CISA KEV catalogue since 31 January 2024, with known ransomware use.9
CVE-2021-44228Apache Log4j2 (Log4Shell).2 In the CISA KEV catalogue since 10 December 2021, with known ransomware use.9
CVE-2024-21412Windows SmartScreen bypass.2 In the CISA KEV catalogue since 13 February 2024, with known ransomware use.9

If an MSP manages your systems, ask which RMM tools it runs and how quickly it patches them.

History

Key Events

  1. Operations first observed. It builds encryptors from a leaked LockBit 3.0 builder, then Conti v3.2,8

  2. Affiliate programme launched, offering 80% of proceeds.2

  3. Announces a move to a cartel model.2

  4. UK retail attacks and claims. At that point Google had not independently confirmed the involvement of Scattered Spider or DragonForce.7

  5. Sophos publishes its MSP case.3

  6. Four arrests in the retail investigation. M&S's chairman names DragonForce ransomware to Parliament.5

  7. Offers affiliates a data analysis service.2

  8. Arete sees increased activity in 2026 compared with 2025.4

  9. Symantec reports abuse of Microsoft Teams relays in an attack with activity from December 2025.1

Detection

Warning Signs

From Sophos,3 Symantec1 and Trend.2 None proves an attack alone.

  • Unexpected installers pushed through an MSP's RMM tool
  • New users, groups or firewall rules on servers
  • A known-vulnerable driver loaded, followed by security tools stopping
  • A legitimate program in an unusual location loading a new DLL
  • ESXi hosts powering off VMs without a change record
What To Do

Defences That Matter

Hold Your MSP to a Standard

  • Ask your MSP to confirm how its RMM tools are patched and protected.
  • Monitor pushes from RMM tools as well as local activity.3
Third-party and supply chain risk

Secure the Help Desk

  • Review how staff verify identity before resetting passwords or MFA, especially for privileged accounts.6
  • Monitor unusual logins, including from VPN services on residential IP ranges.6
Identity security and PAM

Stop Tampering

  • Block known vulnerable drivers with your endpoint controls.
  • Protect EDR agents against tampering. Sophos's EDR blocked encryption on one client.3
24x7x365 EDR

Plan Beyond Prevention

  • Plan for detection, containment, response and recovery, not just prevention.6
  • Include ESXi and NAS systems in recovery tests.
Tabletop and crisis simulations

Could Your MSP Be the Way In?

We can review your supplier access and your response plans against the methods in this profile, and then help you close the gaps.

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