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3AM

A ransomware family first reported in September 2023, when an affiliate used it after LockBit was blocked. In a 2025 case, its actors flooded an employee with email, called them posing as IT, then ran a hidden virtual machine to stay out of sight of security tools.

Threat actor profile. Last reviewed 3 November 2026.

Overview

Why It Matters

Symantec first reported 3AM after an affiliate tried LockBit and switched to 3AM when it was blocked.2 That tells defenders that blocking one encryptor may not end an attack in progress.

The clearest recent case comes from Sophos. In the first quarter of 2025, actors signed an employee up for mailing lists, called while spoofing the IT department's number, and persuaded them to allow a Quick Assist session. They then ran a virtual machine that application control did not block, hiding early activity from endpoint tools. About 868 GB of data left the network before a mostly blocked encryption attempt on day nine.3

Attribution is less firm. Intrinsec considered 3AM likely connected to Royal, now BlackSuit, and Conti.5 Sophos also cites assessments of a BlackSuit link, and says leaked Black Basta chats connect 3AM to vishing actors.3 These are assessments, not confirmed facts. Not every claim holds up: in June 2026 an organisation publicly denied a 3AM listing and said the published data was not its own.4 The sources reviewed do not establish a UK link.

Our View

A flood of spam followed by a helpful phone call has become a recognisable pattern. We would make sure staff know to treat it as a warning, and check whether your application control would stop a portable virtual machine.

Attack Chain

How It Attacks

Based on one Sophos incident from the first quarter of 2025.3 Earlier reporting shows other methods, including Cobalt Strike,2 so affiliates may differ.

  1. 1

    Research the Target

    Gathers employee email addresses and the internal IT department's phone number.

  2. 2

    Flood the Inbox

    Signs the target up to mailing lists, producing a sudden burst of email.

  3. 3

    Call as IT

    Spoofs the IT department's number and persuades the employee to open Quick Assist.

  4. 4

    Hide in a Virtual Machine

    Runs a QEMU virtual machine containing a backdoor, which connects outwards.

  5. 5

    Take Over Accounts

    Compromises service and domain admin accounts, creates a local admin and installs an RMM tool.

  6. 6

    Move and Steal

    Moves using RDP, WMIC and remote PowerShell, and uploads data using GoodSync.

  7. 7

    Try to Encrypt

    Runs the ransomware from a server without endpoint protection, aiming at other machines.

MITRE ATT&CK

Key Techniques

ATT&CK v20 has no group entry for 3AM. This mapping is ours, based on Sophos3 and Symantec's findings as reported.2

IDTechniqueTacticWhat It Looks Like
T1667Email BombingImpactFloods the target's inbox.
T1566.004Spearphishing VoiceInitial AccessCalls while spoofing the IT department.
T1219.002Remote Desktop SoftwareCommand and ControlUses Quick Assist and an RMM tool.
T1564.006Run Virtual InstanceStealthHides activity in a QEMU virtual machine.
T1136.001Local AccountPersistenceCreates a local admin account.
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral MovementMoves over RDP.
T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageExfiltrationUploads data to Backblaze.
T1490Inhibit System RecoveryImpactDeletes volume shadow copies.
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactImpactEncrypts files.
Tooling

Tools Observed

Remote Access

Microsoft Quick AssistXEOX

Malware and Evasion

Cobalt StrikeQDoorQEMU

Data Theft

BackblazeGoodSync

From Sophos3 and Symantec's findings.2 Many are legitimate products, so check whether a tool is approved and expected.

Vulnerabilities

The sources reviewed tie no specific CVE to 3AM.1

History

Key Events

  1. Symantec first reports 3AM.2,3

  2. Intrinsec's research linking 3AM to Conti and Royal is reported.5

  3. The intrusion Sophos later documents.3

  4. Sophos publishes its case study.6

  5. An organisation denies a claim by the group, indicating it is still listing victims.4

Detection

Warning Signs

Drawn from Sophos.3 None of these proves an attack alone.

  • Dozens of unsolicited emails to one person in minutes
  • A call from the IT department that IT did not make
  • Quick Assist sessions after an unsolicited call
  • QEMU or other portable virtual machines on an endpoint
  • Attempts to remove MFA software or deploy an EDR killer
  • GoodSync on servers
What To Do

Defences That Matter

Set Expectations for IT Calls

  • Teach staff how IT will and will not contact them, and which remote tools it uses.3
Security awareness and phishing

Block What Should Not Run

  • Block unapproved tools, including virtual machines like QEMU and RMM tools.3
  • Restrict PowerShell to admins and signed scripts.3
24x7x365 EDR

Tighten Accounts

  • Use strong admin and service passwords, and least privilege.3
  • Restrict service accounts that lack MFA by logon time and privilege.3
Identity security and PAM

Close Network Paths

  • Limit RDP to designated servers and block remote access ports to critical segments.3
  • Protect every server, as this attack ran from the one that had no endpoint protection.3
Zero trust architecture

What Would Your Staff Do After an Email Flood and a Call From IT?

We can test how your people and endpoint controls respond to the methods in this profile.

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